THE MODEL
There are two players, a Sender (S) and a Receiver (R); only S has private information. S observes the value of a random varible, m, whose differentiable probability distribution function, F(m), with density f(m), is supported on [0, 1]. S has a twice continuously differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function Us(y,m, b), where y, a real number, is the action taken by R upon receiving S's signal and b is a scalar parameter we shall later use to measure how nearly agents' interests coincide. R's twice continuously differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstem utility function is denoted UR(y, m). All aspects of the game except m are common knowledge.
Throughout the paper we shall assume that, for each m and for i = R, S, denoting partial derivatives by subscripts in the usual way, U'(y, m) = 0 for some y, and U',(.) < 0, so that Ui has a unique maximum in y for each given (m, b) pair; and that U12(*) > 0. The latter condition is a sorting condition analogous to those that appear in the signaling literature; it ensures that the best value of y from a fully informed agent's standpoint is a strictly increasing function of the true value of m.
The game proceeds as follows. S observes his "type," m, and then sends a signal to R; the signal may be random, and can be viewed as a noisy estimate of m. R processes the information in S's signal and chooses an action, which determines players' payoffs.
The solution concept we shall employ is Harsanyi's [4] Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which is simply a Nash equilibrium in the decision rules that relate agents' actions to their information and to the situations in which they find themselves. Each agent responds optimally to his opponent's strategy choice, taking into account its implications in the light of his probabilistic beliefs, and maximizing expected utility over his possible strategy choices. Although S's signal necessarily precedes R's action in time, because R observes only the signal (and not the signaling rule) S's choice of signaling rule and R's choice of action rule are strategically "simultaneous." Since we do not allow R to commit himself to an action rule and communicate it before S chooses his signaling rule, our solution concept differs from that employed in principal-agent models like Hoimstrom's [6] .
The Bayesian Nash equilibrium is both the natural generalization of the ordinary Nash equilibrium to games with incomplete information and a natural extension of the concept of rational-expectations equilibrium to situations where strategic interactions are important. It is, therefore, a sensible choice of equilibrium concept with which to study strategic communication, guaranteeing that in equilibrium, agents who understand the game extract all available information from signals. To put it another way, this equilibrium concept guarantees that agents' conditional probabilistic beliefs about each other's actions and characteristics are self-confirming.
Formally, an equilibrium consists of a family of signaling rules for S, denoted q(n I m), and an action rule for R, denoted y(n), such that: Condition (1) says that S's signaling rule yields an expected-utility maximizing action for each of his information "types," taking R's action rule as given. Condition (2) says that R responds optimally to each possible signal, using Bayes' Rule to update his prior, taking into account S's signaling strategy and the signal he receives. Since URl(_) < 0, the objective function in (2) is strictly concave iny; therefore, R will never use mixed strategies in equilibrium. Our model departs from the non-strategic signaling literature (see, for example, Spence [15] ) principally in the nature of its signaling costs. Signaling models typically have exogenously given differential signaling costs, which allow the existence of equilibria in which agents are perfectly sorted. Our model has no such costs. But R's equilibrium choice of action rule generally creates endogenous signaling costs, which allow equilibria with partial sorting. This shows that exogenous differential signaling costs are not always needed for informative signaling.
Our model is closely related to that of Green and Stokey [3] , who study strategic information transmission using a definition of equilibrium that differs 2More precisely, we may define an equilibrium to be an action rule for R, denoted y(n), and, for S, a probability distribution A on the Borel-measurable subsets of [ from ours only in assuming that an agent learns his private information after his choice of strategy. We have adopted the alternative assumption that agents already know their private information when choosing their strategies, but in the present context the two definitions are equivalent. Thus, the main difference between our paper and Green and Stokey's is the question considered. They take preferences as given and study the effects of improved information on agents' welfares at equilibrium; we take information as given and study how agents use it differently when their preferences become more similar. (Holmstrom [6] studies the latter question in a principal-agent model.) Green and Stokey's [3] model has many equilibria, including some, which they call "partition" equilibria, in which S introduces noise only by not discriminating as finely as possible in his signal among the different information states he is capable of distinguishing; they focus on these. As pointed out above, our model has multiple equilibria as well, but only partition equilibria. This difference arises because of our additional restrictions on preferences. Our model is also related to those of Kreps and Wilson [7] and Milgrom and Roberts [9, 10] , who handle the problem of information transmission in the same way we do. Milgrom and Roberts' [9] model is closest in form to ours; but they focus mainly on perfectly informative equilibria. This precludes the study of the optimal amount of noise to include in a signal. Perfectly informative equilibria do not exist in our model, mainly because we assume that signaling has no cost to S other than that inherent in its effect on R's choice of action.
EQUILIBRIUM
This section establishes the existence of equilibria in our model, and characterizes them. It is shown that all equilibria are partition equilibria, in which, in effect, S introduces noise into his signal only by not discriminating as finely as possible among the information states he can distinguish. Further, we show that if R's and S's preferences differ, there is a finite upper bound, denoted N(b), on the "size" (that is, the number of subintervals) of an equilibrium partition; and that there exists at least one equilibrium of each size from one through N(b). Necessary and sufficient conditions for a partition of a given size to be consistent with equilibrium are given. In Sections 4 and 5, we give conditions that guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium for each size, and argue that agents might reasonably be expected to coordinate on the equilibrium of size N(b).
We shall defer, for the sake of exposition, consideration of the form of the equilibrium signaling rules, and begin by considering the structure of the set of actions that, in equilibrium, are chosen by R with positive prior probability. REMARKS: Lemma 1 establishes that, under our assumptions, equilibrium must involve noisy signaling unless agents' interests coincide. Because signaling is a purely informational activity in our model, it cannot be perfectly invertible and informative, as it is, for example, in the principal equilibria of Milgrom and Roberts [9] . The argument of Lemma 1 can be used to establish that if Us2 and UR are one-signed, but have opposite signs, then only one action can be induced in equilibrium. Thus in this case no information is transmitted.
We shall now argue that when agents' interests differ, all equilibria in our model are partition equilibria of a particular kind. First, some notation for describing partition equilibria is needed. (12), its initial and terminal conditions. Equation (A) is an "arbitrage" condition, requiring that S-types who fall on the boundaries between steps are indifferent between the associated values of y. With our assumptions on Us, this condition is necessary and sufficient for S's signaling rule to be a best response to y(n). Finally, given the signaling rules in the 3By "essentially," we mean that all equilibria have relationships between m and R's induced choice of y that are the same as those in the class described in the Theorem; they are, therefore, economically equivalent. statement of the Theorem, it is easily verified that the integral on the right-hand side of (9) is R's expected utility conditional on hearing a signal in the step (a, a). It follows that (10) gives R's unique best response to a signal in (ai, ail i), and that the signaling rules given in the Theorem are in equilibrium. Any other signaling rules that induce the same actions would also work;4 and we close by arguing that any other signaling rules consistent with an equilibrium of a given size must, given Lemma 1, induce the same actions.
Formally, we begin by showing that (A), (11), and (12) form a well-defined difference equation, that it has a solution for any N such that 1 < N < N(b), and that any solution, a, together with the signaling rules given in the Theorem, is a best response for S to they(n) that satisfies (10) for the same a. In the rest of this section we sometimes suppress the dependence of Us on b for notational clarity.
First, note that, by (9) and our assumption that UR(.) > 0, y(ai, ai + ) must be strictly increasing in both of its arguments. Let a' denote the partial partition ao, .. ., ai, which is strictly increasing and satisfies (A). There can be at most one value of ai I > ai satisfying (A), because Usl(-) < 0 and y(-) is monotonic. Thus any history ao, . . ., ai determines at most one relevant ai+ 1 > ai. 5 Let (12), any signal in (ai, ai+ 1) is a best response for an S of type m E (ai, ai + ) to they(n) given by (10). More 4In particular, there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which the S-types within each step send a given signal that differs from those sent by other S-types. To support an equilibrium described this way, it is necessary to include, as part of the equilibrium, a specification of how R interprets signals that are not in the support of the signaling rule used by some S-type in equilibrium. In the present context, any such specification that does not expand the set of R's best-response actions will do. 5We are able to restrict attention to the strictly increasing partitions that satisfy (A) because Us(.) < 0 and the monotonicity of y( ) ensure that the only nondecreasing solutions, a, to (A), (11), and (12) satisfy ai < ai+ 1 unless ai = 0 or ai+ I = 1. In the latter two cases, an extreme S-type is indifferent between perfectly revealing his type and sending a signal in the adjacent step. Because m = 0 and m = 1 occur only with zero probability from R's standpoint, these equilibria are therefore essentially equivalent to those in which the extreme S-type does not reveal himself. V(ai-1,ai,ai 1,b) = 0 for 0 < ai-I < ai < ai+I < 1, then Us (y(a, ai), ai, b) > 0 and VI(a, ai, ai, 1, b) <0 for all a E [0, aJ 1], and Us (y(ai,  a), ai, b) < 0 and V3(ai 1, ai, a, b) < Ofor all a E [ai+1, 1] . (y(ai-1, ai), ai, b) = Us(y(ai, ai+ 1), ai, b) by hypothesis, y(ai,  ai+ 1) > y(ai-1, ai) , and U1s1(-) < 0, Uj (y, ai, b) > 0 for y < y(ai1,ai) and Uj(y, ai, b) < 0 for y ? Yj(ai, ai+ ). The Lemma follows from the definition of V becausey(.) is strictly increasing in both of its arguments.
PROOF: Since Us
Q.E.D.
The next result provides a simple condition on preferences that guarantees they are far enough apart so that the only equilibrium is totally uninformative. It is natural to ask which of these equilibria is best for R and S. In general, the answer ex post will be different for different values of m; but ex ante, the answer is simple. If am2 denotes the residual variance of m R expects to have after hearing the equilibrium signal, it is easy to verify that R's and S's ex ante expected utilities are given by EUR = _ 2 and EUs = -(a2 + b2). These expressions reflect the facts that quadratic loss equals variance plus the square of bias and that the rational-expectations character of Bayesian Nash equilibrium eliminates all unconditional bias from R's interpretation of S's signal. R's desire to sety at a level b units lower than S would prefer appears as a bias from S's standpoint. As the expressions for EUR and EUs make clear, before S learns his type, he has an incentive to join with R in reducing variance as much as possible.
Using ( While it must be admitted that comparative statics is a risky business when there are multiple equilibria, we view these results as tending to confirm our intuition that equilibrium should involve more informative signaling the closer agents' interests. There are two reasons for this. First, for a partition of given size, letting b approach zero reduces the equilibrium variance in our example. And second, letting b approach zero, when it expands the set of sizes of partition equilibria that can exist, always does so in the direction of making possible equilibria with "finer" partitions, and therefore lower variances. Because F is fixed and R bases his choice of y on rational expectations, it is natural to take his expected utility as a measure of informativeness. In the quadratic case, EUR = -am2, so if jumps from one size of partition to another occur, if at all, only in the direction in which the set of equilibria expands, our intuition about comparative statics will be fully borne out. These conclusions suggest that it might be useful to seek more general conditions under which making preferences more similar shifts the set of equilibria in a more informative direction; we do this in the next section.
But first, we would like to consider, in the relatively simple context of our example, whether complete agnosticism about which equilibrium will occur is justified, or if some can be ruled out by making further plausible assumptions. Two promising avenues of this type seem open to us. The first is to apply Schelling's [13, Chapter 4] idea of seeking equilibria that seem "prominent," in the hope that they might serve as "focal points" to help agents coordinate their strategy choices. It seems clear to us that in our model, the coarsest and the finest partition equilibria for a given value of b are prominent. The coarsest one, which is necessarily totally uninformative, does not seem very sensible to us (partly for efficiency reasons discussed below), so there remains a case for the equilibrium (y, a, b) + Us(y, a, b) is nondecreasing  in y and fa U/(y, m)f(m) dm + U1R(y, a)f(a) is nonincreasing in a, then all 
CONCLUSION
This paper represents an attempt to characterize rational behavior in interactive two-person situations where direct communication between agents is a possibility. While we have considered explicitly only a small subset of the universe of possible models with this property, our results can be generalized immediately beyond the confines of our model in several directions. These results hint that there may be a good case for presuming that direct communication is more likely to play an important role, the more closely related are agents' goals. Other interesting conclusions suggested by our theory are that perfect communication is not to be expected in general unless agents' interests completely coincide, and that once interests diverge by a given, "finite" amount, only no communication is consistent with rational behavior.
Some worthwhile extensions of the model are suggested by the fact that the structure of our model interacts with the rational-expectations character of our solution concept in such a way that concepts like lying, credibility, and credulity -all essential features of strategic communication-do not have fully satisfactory operational meanings within the model. Generalizations that would test the robustness of our results and help to remedy this defect include allowing lying to have costs for S, uncertain to R, in addition to those inherent in its effect on R's choice of action; allowing R to be uncertain about S's preferences, and therefore about his incentives to communicate truthfully; and allowing S to be uncertain about R's ability to check the accuracy of what he is told.
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